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 Chapter 1 
 Preliminaries: Concepts, Trends, 
and Frameworks 
 This chapter presents background that will provide context for the rest of the report, 
including key concepts and frameworks, recent trends in the emergence of produc-
tion sharing, and a discussion on the potential benefi ts and risks of joining global 
supply chains. 
 Supply Chains 
 A supply chain is normally defi ned as a group of economic units that provide a 
range of tangible and intangible value-adding activities needed to bring a good or 
service from its conception, through the different production phases, to fi nal deliv-
ery to consumers. The supply chain often includes a lead unit that specifi es what is 
to be produced by whom and when. This lead unit typically exercises some control 
over the chain even if it doesn’t have ownership of it. 1 As such, the units tend to 
work in tandem such that the different inputs are produced according to the right 
specifi cations, and distributed in the right quantities, to the right locations, and at the 
right time. Throughout, the goal is typically to minimize costs for the total system. 
 It is common to use the term  supply chain to refer to the network of a particular 
fi rm, such as Nike’s supply chain. The term  value chain is more commonly used in 
a broader context to refer to the industry, as in the footwear value chain. Increasingly, 
however, both terms have been employed indiscriminately, as we do in this report. 
When a supply chain encompasses establishments that are located in different coun-
tries, the term  global supply chain is used. 
1
  The coordinating role can be exercised by a fi rm but also by other units, such as a trader, a 
 wholesaler, or a supermarket. 
2 While a global supply chain is basically a group of establishments working 
together from the design to the distribution of a product, data are often lacking that 
would enable economists to know whether the observed trade transactions are 
 effectively part of an international production network. This is why economists have 
been using broader defi nitions to measure participation of countries in global supply 
chains. In Chap.  2 we introduce some of these defi nitions as well as the measures 
applied to them. 
 The term  value chain suggests that the production process moves in a linear man-
ner, from upstream to downstream stages, a confi guration sometimes likened to that 
of a snake. But production processes can have quite different confi gurations. For 
instance, they can take the form of spiders, in which parts from different locations 
arrive in a central location for fi nal assembly; or of complex combinations of spiders 
and snakes (Baldwin & Venables,  2013 ). Moreover, intermediate inputs can bend 
back, as country A imports an intermediate good from country B that itself uses 
other inputs from country A (Bhagwati,  2013 ). In our analysis we follow the 
 convention in the literature and continue to use  value chain even when referring to 
these more complex production confi gurations. 
 Offshoring Strategies 
 Firms follow different strategies to unbundle their production processes. One is to 
delegate part of the production process to an affi liate in another country. This is 
normally referred to as  vertical FDI —in other words, a vertically linked affi liate 
produces an input that will be used downstream in the multinational’s supply chain. 2 
Another strategy is to outsource part of the production process to an entirely 
 independent fi rm in the other country. This is known as  foreign outsourcing . 
 The term  offshoring is then used in the literature to refer to the international 
fragmentation of production that takes place through either vertical FDI or foreign 
outsourcing. We will follow the same convention here and use the term  offshoring 
when there is no need to make an explicit distinction between vertical FDI and 
 foreign outsourcing. 
 Each strategy—vertical FDI or foreign outsourcing—has advantages and disad-
vantages. For instance, one advantage of vertical FDI is that it potentially eliminates 
the need for costly renegotiations of a contract after an agreement has been reached. 
On the other hand, foreign outsourcing eliminates the fi xed incurred costs of  opening 
an affi liate. 
2
 A different motive for FDI is to replicate the entire production process in another country, 
 typically to save on transportation and other costs and to avoid tariffs. This is referred in the litera-
ture as horizontal FDI. 
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3 The decision to use vertical FDI or foreign outsourcing is known as the 
 internalization decision . The factors involved in making this decision are addressed 
in Chap.  3 when we examine what the internalization decision and its determinants 
imply for the strategies of the Latin American countries regarding accessing GVCs: 
should countries in the region promote links between local suppliers and global 
buyers? Or should they seek to attract vertically linked affi liates to their shores? 
 Why Do Firms Fragment Production Internationally? 
 We are all familiar with the wine-for-cloth example used by David Ricardo in the 
early 1800s to illustrate his theory of comparative advantage. Even if Portugal could 
produce wine and cloth with less labor than England, both countries would gain by 
specializing in the good that they could produce more effi ciently—that is, the good 
in which they had a comparative advantage. While Ricardo was thinking about fi nal 
goods, the same concept applies to tasks performed in making those goods. For 
instance, if making clothes requires two tasks, and at a certain point in time those 
tasks could be separated geographically, the country producing cloth would gain by 
offshoring the task in which it has the least advantage while keeping the other task 
at home. This is true even if the country has an advantage in both tasks. In this way, 
offshoring allows home workers to focus on the tasks that they do relatively better. 
 While the theory of comparative advantage has been around for two centuries, 
the international fragmentation of production and the emergence of global supply 
chains—at least on its current scale—is a relatively recent phenomenon. One could 
then ask, why didn’t fi rms engage more in cross-border production sharing in the 
past? The short answer is that until recently, a number of factors limited the degree 
to which the production of a good could be unbundled. Many of these limitations, 
however, have receded in recent years in response to certain trends. In this report we 
will examine the importance of many of these trends; nevertheless, at this point 
we can offer some preliminary conjectures regarding which trends have facilitated 
the surge in cross-border production sharing. 
 Reduction in trade costs . Traditional barriers, such as tariffs, have been falling 
worldwide, particularly since the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations 
about 20 years ago. While the present Doha Round has progressed very slowly, 
many tariff barriers have continued to fall in several parts of the world, particularly 
in response to the more than 160 regional trade agreements that have come into 
force since 2000. Figure  1.1 , for example, shows world simple averages for 
ad valorem MFN-applied rates and for the percentage of dutiable imports in three 
different years. Today, most countries have ad valorem tariff rates below 10 %, and 
the percentage of dutiable imports tends to be below 70 %. Of course, there are still 
many sectors and countries with high trade barriers, but there is no doubt that in 
most parts of the world today those tariff barriers are signifi cantly lower, providing 
critical incentives for trading blocks of fragmented production across borders.
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4 Reduction in transportation costs . The cost of transporting intermediate inputs is 
also a factor discouraging the geographical relocation of production bundles, par-
ticularly in distant locations. Transport costs have been falling since the introduc-
tion of the steamship and the steam locomotive in the late 1700s and the early 
1800s. But recent developments have accelerated this trend. For instance, bigger 
vessels and aircraft capable of exploiting larger-scale economies are continuously 
being introduced in the transport industry; cargo is increasingly containerized, and 
competition on commercial shipping routes has intensifi ed in recent years. As a 
result, transport costs have continued to fall. Figure  1.2 , for example, shows the 
average ad valorem freight rates associated with the exports of 135 countries to the 
US in 1974 (vertical axis) and 2006 (horizontal axis). Most points are located above 
the diagonal line, indicating that transport costs have sharply declined in most parts 
of the world. The reduction in freight rates therefore adds to the decline in tradi-
tional barriers such as tariffs, making total trade costs in most parts of the world a 
fraction of what they were in the past.
 The emergence of logistics companies . The number of logistics companies in the 
world has increased rapidly since the 1970s. Data from Dun & Bradstreet, for exam-
ple, indicate that between 1970 and 2011, supply chain management fi rms and freight 
forwarders have multiplied by three and eight times, respectively. Logistics compa-
nies offer a wide range of services—from the preparation of documents, such as com-
mercial invoices and bills of lading, to support activities, such as freight consolidation, 
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 Fig. 1.1  Measures of Import Restrictions, World Averages  Note : The ad valorem tariff rates and 
the percentage of dutiable imports are calculated as simple averages across countries.  Source : 
Authors’ calculations based on data from TRAINS 
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5of goods across borders. The surge of logistics companies has also been accompanied 
by attempts by a few fi rms to become truly globally oriented. For instance, in 2012, 
UPS, a major logistics company based in the US, announced the acquisition of TNT 
Express, a Dutch logistics fi rm with a strong presence in Europe; the move was 
designed to fi ll a gap in UPS’s Europe operations. 3 The rise of these global logistics 
companies and the ever-growing worldwide network of places that they serve have 
greatly helped fi rms propel their supply chains around the world. Support for this 
claim can be found in the words of Victor Fung, chairman of Li & Fung, the well-
known garment company and world leader in buyer-driven supply chains:
 There is absolutely no way we could conduct our business today without the growth of people 
like UPS, who describe what they do as synchronized commerce. With this logistical support 
to move products and components, you are able to achieve faster turnaround times… 4 
 The surge of specialized logistics services and platforms has intensifi ed in recent 
years to meet the demand of many fi rms for assistance in creating seamless supply 
chains. 
3
 According to  The Economist , March 24, 2012. 
4
  Speech by Victor Fung to the Executive Committee of the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
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 Fig. 1.2  Ad Valorem Freight Rates of Exports to the US, Country Averages  Note : The fi gure 
shows fi tted ad valorem rates derived from country regressions that control for changes in the mix 
of products traded over time. See Hummels ( 2007 ).  Source : Authors’ calculations based on 
 U.S. Imports of Merchandise of the U.S. Census Bureau 
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6 Reduced information costs and improved communications . In the last two 
decades, production processes, international trade, and commerce in general have 
been impacted by vast increases in computerization power, the Internet, massive 
growth in the network capacity of optical fi ber, and a range of inexpensive informa-
tion transmission capabilities. There have been major improvements in the quality, 
capacity, and reliability of communication technologies, including faxes, emailing, 
and videoconferencing. Before these developments, proximity was necessary to 
keep the costs of coordination low (Baldwin,  2012 ). But today, the transmission of 
information and communication over vast distances is fast, accessible, and accurate. 
The result has been lower costs for coordinating and monitoring blocks of produc-
tion at a distance, which facilitates the unbundling of production to distant loca-
tions. Additionally, improved information technology has also been very helpful in 
facilitating the transmission of previously tacit knowledge through codifi cation and 
industry-level standards (Sturgeon,  2008 ). 
 Contract enforcement and intellectual property rights . Global production net-
works necessarily entail contracting relationships between agents in different coun-
tries with different legal systems and contracting institutions. Uncertain and 
ambiguous practices in contract enforcement can undermine international transac-
tions. The problem can be particularly acute in international supply chains because 
they tend to involve signifi cant relationship-specifi c investments. Likewise, weak 
intellectual property rights can undermine the delegating of links of the value chain 
to other parties for fear of intellectual property infringement and the unauthorized 
use of technical and production knowledge by the other party. Recent trends in 
 contract enforcement and property rights have reduced these fears. For instance, 
the costs of enforcing contracts have consistently declined worldwide, particularly 
in the industrialized countries. 5 The world has also seen a remarkable improvement 
in the protection of intellectual property rights, particularly with the recent conclu-
sion of the WTO agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights, or TRIPS (Maskus,  2012 ). Such developments have improved the willing-
ness of fi rms that engage in international fragmentation of production to engage 
with foreign suppliers and their countries’ institutions. 
 What Do Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Stand to Gain? 
 Global value chains provide countries with opportunities to industrialize at a faster 
pace than in the past. Many of today’s industrialized countries developed by build-
ing entire supply chains within their own territories, with all the challenges, costs, 
5
  Based on comparisons between 2003 and 2012 from Doing Business data on enforcing contracts. 
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7and time that this entails (Baldwin,  2012 ). The emergence of GVCs, however, is 
allowing nations to industrialize much more rapidly by joining international pro-
duction networks rather than by building entire supply chains at home. Fragmentation 
and vertical specialization are enabling countries to participate in world markets by 
eliminating the need to master all the aspects involved in the production of a fi nal 
good (Baldwin,  2011 ). This has been the path to industrialization taken by some 
Asian countries and, more recently, by some Eastern European countries as well. 
 The gains from participating in global value chains can also be measured in 
terms of increased trade opportunities that did not exist in the past. The fragmenta-
tion of production and the relocation of slices of the value chain across various 
countries opens up new opportunities for trade diversifi cation, an issue of particular 
importance for Latin America and the Caribbean. The export base of our region is 
highly concentrated in natural resource-intensive sectors, a trend that has intensifi ed 
during the last decade with the emergence of China. While specialization in the 
region’s factor-abundant sectors provides the basis for important gains from trade, 
complete specialization in natural resources could also have negative consequences. 
The literature referring to these risks is long and well known. Some examples are 
the notion that natural resource-intensive goods might produce too much instability 
in the economy due to their high price volatility, which, in the absence of appropri-
ate hedging opportunities, can hurt growth (Larrain, Sachs, & Warner,  1999 ). 
Negative consequences can also be related to the familiar concept of Dutch disease 
(Corden,  1984 ) or to the notion that natural resource-rich countries concentrate their 
resources in land, crops, and extractive equipment, leaving minimal incentives to 
invest in human capital which, in turn, inhibits diversifi cation towards more 
technology- intensive, higher-return activities, with the result of undermining future 
growth (Leamer, Maul, Rodriguez, & Schott,  1999 ). 
 Beyond the issue of natural resources, export diversifi cation per se has been justi-
fi ed on other grounds. For instance, a diversifi ed export base can help to protect 
countries from sector-specifi c shocks and their negative effects on export revenue, 
income, and growth. Countries that expand their exports beyond a limited number 
of products also lower their risks of worsening their terms of trade (see, e.g., 
Hummels & Klenow,  2005 ). Other arguments are based on a direct link between 
export variety and growth that result from productivity gains arising either from 
learning by exporting or from having a better resource allocation (see, e.g., Feenstra 
& Kee,  2004 ; Lederman & Maloney,  2003 ). 
 Participation in global production networks has also been associated with other 
benefi ts, including learning, technology transfers, and knowledge spillovers. 
Evidence of successful cases of learning within the chain can be found in many sec-
tors, such as apparel (Gereffi ,  1999 ), motorcycles (Fujita,  2011 ), agroindustry 
(Cafaggi et al.,  2012 ), and the computer industry (Kawakami,  2011 ). In some cases, 
knowledge and skills that fi rst-tier suppliers absorb from global players also diffuse 
to other fi rms (Poon,  2004 ). 
 Learning from interaction with global actors might confer different benefi ts, 
such as improving production processes, attaining consistent and high quality, and/
or increasing the speed of response (Humphrey & Schmitz,  2000 ). 
What Do Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean Stand to Gain?
8 In this way, the acquisition of various forms of knowledge, including technical and 
managerial, and the further diffusion of this knowledge, constitute additional benefi ts 
from accessing international supply chains. Box  1 shows an example in which the 
 Box 1: Chili Pepper and Knowledge Transfer in Global Supply Chains 
 How knowledge is transferred from a lead fi rm to its supplier can be illus-
trated with the case of a Colombian fi rm, Hugo Restrepo y Cía’s. The example 
is interesting for at least two reasons. First, the transfer of knowledge occurred 
in the agribusiness industry instead of the often discussed high-tech indus-
tries, showing that learning from global players can occur in traditional sec-
tors. Second, the knowledge transfer was not limited to the core technology of 
the agribusiness industry but also included managerial aspects. 
 Hugo Restrepo y Cía’s is the main provider of chili pepper paste for the 
Tabasco brand owned by the American fi rm McIlhenny Company. Large- 
scale hot sauce makers frequently outsource the production of chili pepper 
paste to growers in relationships that require continuous interactions to guar-
antee the quality of the chilies that go into the production process. 
 The relationship between McIlhenny and Hugo Restrepo began in the late 
1970s with a few chili pepper seeds provided by McIlhenny and a great deal 
of trial and error on the part of Hugo Restrepo. Both fi rms agreed on a busi-
ness model in which McIlhenny would provide expertise to Hugo Restrepo in 
exchange for exclusivity for the next 15 years, during which Hugo Restrepo 
could not produce for other clients. The relationship was established by a 
long-term agreement based on contracts that were renewed every 2 years. 
 At the beginning of this relationship, the quality of the chili pepper paste 
produced by Hugo Restrepo was low, so McIlhenny sent an experienced 
agronomist to Hugo Restrepo twice a year to check on the crop and advise on 
technological innovations. As a result, over the next 15 years, Hugo Restrepo 
acquired key technical knowledge on crop management and production, and 
its agronomists developed expertise. After the exclusivity period ended, the 
fi rm no longer needed the technical assistance from McIlhenny. 
 Armed with its new technical knowledge, Hugo Restrepo ventured out on 
its own and expanded its business. It entered into many relationships with 
small farmers of chili pepper in Peru as well as in Colombia, providing them 
with technical knowledge originally acquired from McIlhenny and with seeds. 
As such, Hugo Restrepo applied lessons learned from McIlhenny to guarantee 
itself a stable supply of high-quality chili pepper through permanent technical 
support and appropriate and long-term agreements based on contracts renewed 
every 2 years. Meanwhile, Hugo Restrepo focused its attention on other activ-
ities in the supply chain, such as packaging and logistics. 
 In this way, Hugo Restrepo acquired not only key technical knowledge 
from a global buyer but also a successful business model that the fi rm was 
able to replicate with growers that eventually became its own suppliers. 
 Source : Based on material from Meléndez and Uribe ( 2012 ). 
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9learning of a Colombian supplier from a global fi rm comprised the transfer not only 
of technical capabilities but also of managerial skills needed to conduct a business. 
Additional benefi ts from participating in global production networks are associated 
with market access and the distribution channels developed by a brand leader. 
 Immense Opportunities but also Potential Risks 
 While the potential gains and benefi ts from joining global supply chains seem 
remarkable, there are also limitations and risks. For instance, evidence indicates that 
benefi ts from GVCs may only materialize under specifi c conditions related to the 
nature of inter-fi rm relationships, the level of absorptive capacity of the supplier, or 
the technology used in the supply chain, among others (Gereffi , Humphrey, & 
Sturgeon,  2005 ; Pietrobelli & Rabellotti,  2007 ,  2011 ; Schmitz,  2006 ). 
 Firms joining global supply chains not only must meet conditions but also face 
potential risks. We mentioned that global supply chains offer the potential for rapid 
learning, which seems to be supported by several analyses. However, the literature 
also highlights some of the limitations to acquiring knowledge from global players. 
One is that the learning process might be quite narrow in scope. For instance, 
research on the footwear supply chain shows that the contribution of the lead fi rms 
to their suppliers tends to be exclusively related to production; suppliers learn little 
about non-production activities, which tend to be part of the buyer’s main functions, 
such as design and marketing. Findings generally show that knowledge is transmit-
ted to the suppliers as long as the learning does not trespass on the lead fi rm’s core 
competences (Humphrey & Schmitz,  2000 ). 6 
 A related concern is that rapid learning from global buyers may lead to short- 
term gains but also long-term disadvantages. The hypothetical scenario is that of a 
small producer in a developing country that receives all the necessary instructions 
to supply a good to a particular buyer, but does not necessarily acquire a broader 
knowledge about how to break into the buyer’s market on its own if the relationship 
with the global fi rm came to an end (Humphrey,  2004 ). 
 Finally, offshoring decisions regarding the location of a lead fi rm’s suppliers can 
rapidly change. Many fi rms that fragment production internationally are constantly 
evaluating their sourcing strategies, including the option of reshoring. Some recent 
studies have indicated that between 15 % (MIT,  2012 ) and 20 % (Hackett Group, 
 2012 ) of US manufacturing fi rms engaged in offshoring are engaged in reshoring 
initiatives. Other studies have suggested that offshoring is diminishing (KPMG, 
 2012 ). Changes in offshoring strategies can certainly be quite damaging to the 
 countries of the suppliers. A supplier sometimes must make specifi c investments to 
participate in a production network, such as tailor-made and customized inputs. 
If supply chain relationships end, suppliers in developing countries could be left 
with machinery and capital goods with little or no alternative use. 
6
  It is also been argued that more mutually benefi cial interactions are expected to occur when 
knowledge is more tacit (Giuliani, Pietrobelli, & Rabellotti,  2005 ). 
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10
 In this way, joining international production networks can entail risks that potential 
participants should not ignore. Nevertheless, some of these risks can be manageable. 
For instance, even though lead fi rms are normally less willing to transfer knowledge 
in activities related to their core competences, suppliers can still tap into many seg-
ments that are not part of these core competences. For example, research on a horti-
culture chain showed that suppliers of supermarkets not only took part in production 
activities but eventually started operating in other areas, such as quality certifi cation, 
packaging, and a range of logistics activities (Dolan & Humphrey,  2000 ). 
 Regarding the very real risk of being locked within the narrow knowledge of one 
buyer, there is ample evidence of fi rms that apply skills and capabilities acquired in 
one market to serve new markets and customers (Meléndez & Uribe,  2012 ; Navas- 
Alemán,  2011 ; Tewari,  1999 ). Some of these fi rms eventually develop their own 
brands (Cafaggi et al.,  2012 ; Poon,  2004 ). Regarding reshoring, it is important to 
note that recent trends do not necessarily signal the end of offshoring. According to 
a recent study, most fi rms are still sending more production to other countries than 
the amount they are bringing back home (Hackett Group,  2012 ). Moreover, recent 
reshoring trends might just be a shift from a global sourcing strategy to a more 
regional sourcing strategy: Chinese fi rms serve those of other Asian countries, fi rms 
from Eastern European countries serve those of Western Europe, and fi rms in 
the US, Mexico, or elsewhere in Latin America serve fi rms in the Americas 
(MIT,  2012 ). Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the mere possibility 
that offshoring strategies could reverse at any time should be a powerful reminder 
to potential suppliers that participation in global value chains is not only about 
entering into the network, but also about sustaining the capabilities that made the 
entry possible in the fi rst place. 
 Rationale for Public Policy 
 As stated above, joining global value chains can provide many benefi ts to a country’s 
economy, such as creating opportunities for trade diversifi cation or providing access 
to technical/managerial knowledge. But the rationale for public policies cannot be 
based solely on the existence of potential gains and benefi ts. Public interventions 
should be justifi ed on the basis of market failures such as externalities, coordination 
failures, or the inability of the market to provide a public good. 
 In this report we will present cases where public policy is required to address mar-
ket failures that limit participation of fi rms in GVCs. For instance, in Chap.  3 we will 
show that the likelihood of joining international production networks may depend on 
the provision of certain public goods, such as transport infrastructure, or specifi c 
types of regulation, such as contract enforcement. In other cases, coordination among 
fi rms and the public sector may be necessary to provide collective goods, such as 
airport storage facilities. Coordination among fi rms may also be necessary in the case 
of industries related through backward and forward linkages. For example, an assem-
bly plant might be unable to start operations in a given location because there are no 
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local suppliers of a particular component; but at the same time, a potential supplier of 
that component might not initiate production because there is no local downstream 
demand for that product and exporting is costly (Trindade,  2005 ). 
 Sometimes, the public intervention might be justifi ed on the basis of externali-
ties. For example, information generated by a supplier’s successful search for inter-
national buyers may spill over to other suppliers. In particular, once a supplier has 
obtained a contract with a lead fi rm and establishes a good track record (showing in 
the process that the country as a whole is capable of delivering a good product), it is 
easier for other suppliers in the sector to follow without incurring the same costs as 
the initial supplier. In so doing, the followers obtain important benefi ts from the fi rst 
supplier’s initial investments (and simultaneously devalue the initial supplier’s 
potential benefi ts from its searches). The private returns from establishing relation-
ships with the buyer would accordingly be lower than the corresponding social 
returns, and thus the investment in developing those relationships would be subop-
timally low. This provides a rationale for public intervention. Spillovers can also 
take place among the buyers. For example, the “discovery” by a buyer of a well- 
qualifi ed local supplier may also benefi t other buyers, and thus the private returns 
associated with any investment to assist that supplier in developing its skills and 
capabilities may be lower than the social returns. This gap between private and 
social returns also provides a rationale for intervention. 
 Therefore, there are many instances in which the existence of market failures 
could provide a rationale for public intervention in the area of GVCs. However, 
identifying specifi c market failures can be challenging. For instance, measuring the 
existence of spillovers might be diffi cult because they by no means occur automati-
cally (see Blyde, Pietrobelli, & Volpe,  2014 ). Notwithstanding these challenges, 
countries should seek to substantiate as much as possible their interventions in 
GVCs on the basis of market failures. 
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